An Armored Division Can Have Too Many Tanks
Ultimately, the most important organizational fact about armored divisions is not the number of tanks on hand; indeed a division can have too many tanks. In order to operate with maximal effectiveness, the tanks have to be supported by other arms such as, infantry, artillery, engineers, and so forth. Experience has demonstrated that the critical factors in mechanized organization are
- a rough parity among the numbers of tank, infantry, and artillery battalions, in the ratio 1:1:1, and
- that all elements be equally mobile. This greatly enhances tactical flexibility and enables the division to hold the ground it takes, a task that tanks cannot do without infantry, as tanks are most effective attacking, not defending.
To further strengthen the ability of an armored division to perform its duties it ought to have a strong reconnaissance element able to seek out and secure information. Ideally, a reconnaissance battalion ought to be something of an armored division in miniature, with tank, artillery, and infantry elements enabling it to fight for information when necessary. Similarly, an armored division requires considerable support from engineer and signal troops, the former to facilitate overcoming natural and tactical obstacles, and the latter to keep the fast-moving elements of the division in constant communication. On this basis, it can be seen that most of the divisions formed in the prewar years were deficient in some form or another.
— Dirty Secrets of World War II, Chapter 1
