Rise of the Chiefs
Anthropologists commonly use the term "chiefdom" for a primitive culture that has developed a formal social hierarchy in which the war leader holds a unique and permanent rank above all his tribesmen, often with theocratic and redistributive functions as well. Such chiefdoms are familiar in ethnographic literature because they are common in the hinterlands of civilized societies. Among the known examples, the eighteenth-century [C.E.] kingdom of Hawaii may represent the highest point of development. Most of the known examples, like Hawaii, owed much to contact with civilized peoples, who tend to think that such well-organized tribes are more typical of the primitive world than they really are, because the societies in contact with civilized people tend to be like that} In the Neolithic, chiefdoms of this type were probably less common than in historical times, but there is no reason to doubt that they existed here and there. They provided a transitional stage in social development between the tribe and the state. At the level of the chiefdom, the causes of war become more complicated and the motives for war become separable. We can now distinguish among ideological, economic, and political motives.
- The articulated motives for war are still revenge and prestige. The difference is that wars are now fought to avenge wrongs against the chief and for the honor and glory of the chief Primitive militarism is being replaced by kingly or theocratic militarism, an ideology that continues without much change until the time of Louis XIV.
- The economic causes of war become more compelling. Genuine conquests and occupations are now possible, so wars can be fought more openly and directly to gain territory. The values of honor and glory may become a pretext, masking a chief's grab for land and wealth.
- Finally, war becomes an organizational source of power. It is now possible to fight wars simply for political reasons, and the martial values may become a pretext for a chief's grab at power for its own sake.
It has been pointed out in the preceding chapter how warfare, at some early stage in human evolution, escaped from the control of nature and became an instrument of culture. By the time the stage of the chiefdom is reached, warfare has begun to escape from the control of culture and is becoming a political instrument used in the search for wealth and power by a ruler who is no longer responsive to the collective interests of his people. The forces of escalation break loose. Armies, recruited by command as well as consensus, may number in the hundreds or even the thousands, are able to fight formal battles in line, and may be capable of systematic tactics and strategies. A specialized warrior class is likely to emerge, and wherever it does, its extravagant demands for honor and glory multiply the pressures for military escalation. The trophies of honor and glory become more lucrative and now include prisoners of war for slavery, sacrifice, and cannibalism, all of which become additional incentives for warfare. The rituals of war become grand and expensive, and the Red Spirits are promoted to war gods.
The more advanced chiefdoms appear to practice what is today called warfare in every sense, except for the lack of an ideology that permits self-conscious strategic thinking. The history of political warfare should therefore begin with these chiefdoms, except that they have no history. In spite of their efficiency, chiefdoms do not seem to last. Only a bare handful of chiefdoms have ever made the full transition to bureaucratic state. The process of military escalation and political centralization is reversible, and normally, it is reversed. The disadvantages of losing freedom to the chief are as obvious as the advantages of military superiority, so the chiefdom rarely survives the death of the chief, which is likely to be premature. Countless societies may have come to the edge of statehood and drawn back from that brink. Chiefdoms do not last because of their efficiency.
— Doyne Dawson, The Origins of Western Warfare, pp. 35-36
